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INTRODUCTION 
Brown v. Board of Education1 is the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision 
addressing race. In Brown, the Court declared that state-sponsored racial 
segregation of public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause. When decided in 1954, Brown sparked 
enormous political and legal controversy. Today, it is considered the 
cornerstone of modem equal protection jurisprudence on race, standing 
for the principle that invidious governmental discrimination against 
racial minorities is inunoral and unconstitutional. However, 
understanding Brown solely as a case dealing with race and racial 
segregation obscures the fact that racial segregation in public schools has 
always been about both race and gender. As a system of legal 
subordination, racial segregation concerns the regulation of gender 
relations as much as it concerns the regulation of race relations. 
An examination of the law and practice of two aspects of Jim Crow 
society, racial segregation in public schools and the prohibition of 
interracial marriages, shows that racial segregation is actually a system 
of racial and gender subordination. Although scholars today typically 
analyze racial school segregation and antimiscegenation laws only as 
discrete forms of racial discrimination, a closer examination reveals the 
interplay of race and gender. These issues are so intertwined that Loving 
v. Virginia,2 the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision striking down 
antimiscegenation laws, should be viewed as a continuation of the 1954 
Brown3 decision. Loving is as much a case about racial segregation in 
public schools as Brown is a case about prohibiting interracial marriages. 
Both cases ultimately implicate the states' attempts to regulate racial and 
gender relations. 
However, legal scholars do not regard racial segregation as a system of 
race and gender subordination, nor do they consider Brown's gender 
implications. Our inability to see the gendered nature of racial 
segregation undermines our ability to fully understand how racial 
subordination operates and thus undermines our ability to develop 
effective strategies for ending racial subordination. We have lost sight of 
the gendered aspects of racial segregation due to the language we use to 
analyze the structures of racial segregation. Our essentialist language 
blinds us to the multidimensional nature of racial subordination systems. 
347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
Brown, 347 U.S. at495. 
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This Essay works through essentialist language tO reveal the 
multidimensional nature of racial segregation as a system of 
subordination. Specifically, it examines how racial segregation in public 
schools and laws prohibiting interracial marriage mutually reinforce 
racial and gender inequality. Part I discusses Brown and the traditional 
analysis of that decision as a case dealing with race, racial stigma, and 
equal educational opportunity. Part II reviews laws prohibiting 
interracial marriage, the reasoning and purpose behind these laws, and 
the Loving decision that rendered such laws unconstitutional. Part III 
then examines racial segregation in public schools as more than just a 
system regulating race in education. This Part contends that racial 
segregation should be viewed more broadly as a tool of 
antimiscegenation. Just like laws prohibiting interracial marriage, a 
central purpose of racial segregation was to prevent the development of 
intimate social relationships between blacks and whites. Segregationists 
believed this was necessary to prevent the production of racially mixed 
children and thus preserve white supremacy and white racial purity. 
Part IV demonstrates that once racial segregation is viewed as an 
antimiscegenation tool, it becomes clear that racial segregation in public 
schools is as much about regulating gender relations as it is about 
regulating race relations. Our essentialist language, however, prevents 
us from perceiving the intertwined gender-racial components of Jim 
Crow segregation. This final Part first briefly discusses theories of 
essentialism and anti--essentialism, and then it explicates an anti­
essentialist theory of language. Next, it shows how the way we talk 
about race and racial segregation obscures the gendered nature of racial 
segregation. Finally, it employs an anti-essentialist linguistic analysis to 
illustrate how we can glean new insights into racial subordination by 
renaming "racial segregation" as "gender segregation on the basis of 
race" or "racial-gender segregation." 
I. 	 RACIAL SEGREGATION IN PuBLIC ScHOOLS AND THE TRADffiONAL 
VIEW OF BROWN: A CASE ABOUT EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 
Racial segregation was the lynchpin of Southern Jim Crow society. 
The systematic physical and social separation of the white and black 
races was fundamental to maintaining a social system of white 
supremacy and black inferiority. In Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Court dealt with the constitutionality of state-imposed racial segregation 
2006] Interracial Marriage in the Shadows ofJirn Crow 1325 
in public schools.4 It declared that such segregation violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.1 The landmark 
decision not only overruled the infamous 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson6 case, 
which held that state-imposed racial segregation was constitutionally 
permissible state action, but also helped to catalyze the civil rights 
movement.7 However, while today we laud Brown as a seminal and 
foundational equal protection decision, in 1954 it sparked enormous 
legal and political controversy. Southern states fiercely resisted the 
racial integration of its schools.8 The intensity of that resistance vvas 
ultimately attributable to the fact that Southerners knew Brown's 
implications would extend far beyond the context of schooling and 
education. They understood Brown could deeply transform the realm of 
intimate relations behvcen vvhites and blacks. 
As one of the most important hventieth century Supreme Court 
decisions, Brown has been heavily analyzed by legal commentators.9 
Id. at 487-88. 
Id 
163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAJ\", FROM Jll\I CROV..' TO Crvn. RICHT:;, THE SUPREME 
COURT Al\:D THE STRUGGl F !·OR RACIAL EQUITY 363-442 (2004) (examining history and 
urcum~tilnces <;urrounding Supreme Court's civil rights decisions.). 
" See generally NLMAN v BARl"LEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RES!STA'.\/CE: RACF A\;l) 
Po1.r11cs 1:-.: THE SOLTH DUR!Nl, niE 1950"s, .i.t 67-81 (1969} (discu~sing polillcs of south!.'m 
resistance to public bchool intergration); David E. Bernstem & Ilya Somm, Judicial Power rind 
Civil Rights Recons1drred, 114 YAT.F L.] ..~91 (2004) (examining relevant Supreme Court civil 
rights decisions, especially Progressive Era c.i.ses and Brown); BennD C. Schmidt, Jr., 
l'rinciple and Prejudice· Tlw Supreme Co11rt and Mee in rhe Progressive Era: Par/ 1. Tl1e lleyday 
of Jim Crow, 82 Co1 U\.f. !.. REV. 444 (1982) (describing Jim Crow laws and courts' decisions 
concerning raCJal separation) 
' See generally Alexander M. Bickel. T!1e Original Understanding and tlu> Segrrgatmn 
Ueciswn, 69 !-!ARV. L RFV. l (1955) (prov1d1ng point by point discussion by legislators 
enacting 1-ourteenth Amendment dnd their intention to end discrimin,1hon against 
freedmen); Ernst Bonnskl, A Legal and Sociological An11iysis of t!1e Segrrgat1on Deci;mn of Muy 
17, 1954, 1.~ lJ Prrr. L. R~v. 622 (1954) (analyzing legal and social .ispects of Brown v. Board 
of [ducation); J. Braxf(1n Craven, Jr., Integrating the Desegregation Vocabulary - - Brov.·n Rides 
North, ,\1aybe, 73 W. VA. l. REV. 1 {1971) (discusbing Brown's impact on Northern 
desegregatiDn); G. L. Der~~cy, "Segregatmn Cases" Supreme Court, 38 NtB. L. RFV. 1017 (19.~9} 
(discu~sing Brown, along with other ~egregation cases); Owen M. f.iss, Sd1vol Uesegregalwn; 
The U11cer!LJin Path of i!ie Law, 4 l'llIL & PuB AFF. 3 (1974); Danid Gordon. Happy 
Anniversary Bn"vn v. Board of Education: In 1'\/eed ofa Remake After 1-orty Years?, 25 CoLC\.f. 
HUM RT<;. L. REV 107 (1993) (analy/,ing \~·hether Court made dec1s1on based on social 
pre~sures or constitutional viol.ihons); Benj.irnin ! I. Kii:er, The Impact of Brown v Boar<l of 
Education, 2 CO:-JL. L. REV. I (1967) (discussing Brown's impa<t on Americ.in soGety), 
Laun,nce VV. Knovde~, School Desegregation, 42 N.C. L. RFV 67 (1963) (discussing various 
aspects of school desegregation after Brown); lJon,,\d E. Lively, Dr>egresution and /hf 
Suprfme Court; The Futul Attraction ofBro\vn, 20 H/\SrINGS COJ\"ST. L.Q. 649 (1993) (arguing 
that ~ince Brow11, CouTt has retreatPd from commitment to desegregate schools}; Louis 
1326 University of California, Davis [Vol. 39,1321 
Well-established views hold that Brown is a case about: (1) how 
segregation of public schools denied equal educational opportunity to 
segregated black schoolchildren,10 by (2) stigmatizing them and treating 
them as racially inferior to white schoolchildren. 11 
In Brown, black public schoolchildren filed suit challenging their 
racially segregated schools and seeking to be admitted into schools on a 
"nonsegregated basis."12 The plaintiffs' primary obstacle in challenging 
the constitutionality of racially segregated public schools was the Court's 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. u Plessy upheld state racial segregation 
laws as long as they provided for separate but equal treatment of the 
races. 
14 Thus, under Plessy's separate but equal doctrine, racially 
Lusky, 111e Stereotype: Hard Core of Raci;;m, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 450 (1964) {suggesting that 
Brown was first time Court ignored remedying constitutional harm suffered by individual 
plaintiffs in order to fashion remedy for entire class of individuals in similar 
circumstances); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown fs Dead! Long Live Brown!: The Endless 
Attempt lo Canonize a Case, 80 VA. L. REV. 161 (1994) (arguing against notion that Brown set 
stage for civil rights movement and legislative action); Steven Siegel, Race, Education, and 
the Equal Protection Clause in the 1990s: The Meaning of Brown v. Board of Education Re­
Examined in Light of Milwaukee's Schools of African Amerir;a11 Immersion, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 501 
(1991) (finding principles articulated in Brown problematic when applied to Milwaukee's 
attempt lo improve education of black children); Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173 (1994) (noting Brown's prohibition of reliance on 
race for purposes of advancing segregation); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really 
Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991) (noting that 
personal contributions and interrelationships of Oustices) Vinson, Frankfurter, and Warren 
significantly affected Brown's final outcome); Note, Desegregation of Public Sc/ioo/s: An 
Affirmative Duty to Eliminate Racial Segregation Root and Branch, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 
(1968) (discussing desegregation of public schools in light of Brawn decision). 
10 See, e.g., Michael Klannan, An fnterpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 213, 238-39 (1991). 
'' See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. 
L. REv. 1, 10 (1976). 
" Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954). 
" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550.51 (1896). 
" ld. See generally CHARLES A. LoFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HlSTORICAL 
INTERPRETATION 3 (1987) (discussing Plessy's legal history); Derrick Bell, Revocable Rights 
and a Peoples' Faith: Plessy's Past in Our Future, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 347 (1999) 
(observing that during times of economic crisis, black needs become vulnerable to 
compromise and sacrifice); Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese 
Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996) {placing Plessy dissent into context of Justice Harlan's 
decisions in Chinese exclusion and citizenship cases); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Silent Resurrection 
ofPlessy: The Supreme Court's Acquiescence in the Resegregalion of American's Sc/1ools, 9 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1999) (analyzing Supreme Court decisions contradicting Brown 
decision); Molly Townes O'Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet; The Plessy 
Dissenter's Color Blind Constitution, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753 (1998) (attributing 
Harlan's Plessy dissent to his willagging support of federalism); J. Clay Smith, Jr., Exact 
Justice and the Spirit of Protest: Tile Case of Plessy v. Ferguson and the Black Lawyer, 4 How. 
SCROLL Soc. JUST. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing role of black lawyers in bringing about justice in 
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segregated schools were constitutional as long as white and black 
schools were equal in terms of physical facilities and other tangible 
factors. 15 In Brown, however, the Court rejected the application of the 
Plessy doctrine. It reasoned that schools with equal tangible factors may 
not truly be equal for purposes of equal protection: 
There are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved 
have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to 
buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and 
other 'tangible' factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot tum on 
merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and 
white schools involved in each of these cases. We must look instead 
to the effects of segregation on public education. 16 
The Court then concluded that, even if black and white schools had 
equal tangible factors, racial segregation still impeded the learning of 
black schoolchildren.'7 It therefore held that laws requiring or permitting 
racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.rn 
In declaring racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, the 
Court's opinion focused narrowly on the relationship between racial 
segregation and equal educational opportunity. Throughout its opinion, 
the Court emphasized the importance of education in modern society. It 
associated a sound system of public education with citizenship and 
democracy. Education, the Court asserted, "is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principle instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment."19 The Court 
then hinted at the fundamental nature of the right to education, 
declaring that once a state has provided for public education, access to 
that education "must be made available to all on equal terms."w The 
Court then asked whether the "segregation of children in public schools 
Am<'ric.i); William \1. Wiecek, Civil Rights: UJok1ng Rack - Loakn1g Fanvard.: A Synoptic of 
United. Stales Supreme Court Decisions Affecting the Rig!1ts of African-Americans, 1873-1940, 4 
BARRY L. REV. 21 (2003) (discussing history of civil rights cases that affected African 
Americ<lns). 
'' See Sweatt v. Pairiter, 339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1930) (holding black !aw school 
uriconstitutional because it wa~ separate but W1equal to white law ~chool). 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. 
Id. at 494. 
" [d. at 495. 

" Id. at 493. 

,, [d.. 
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solely on the basis of race deprive[d] the children of the minority 
group of equal educational opportunitics?""1 The Court affirmatively 
answered its own question: "We believe that it does."22 
()nee the Brown Court framed the issue as equal educational 
opportunity, it devoted the remainder of its opinion to examining how 
racial segregation in public schools denied black schoolchildren this 
equal opportunity.L~ That argument focused on the harmful 
psychological effects of racial segregation on segregated black 
schoolchildren.24 Specifically, the Court emphasized the stigmatic harm 
that undermined their learning and education.Lo The Court quoted at 
length a district court decision that found that racial segregation had a 
detrimental psychological impact on black schoolchildren.2" Then, in a 
famous passage, the Court asserted that, "[tjo separate [black children] 
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."27 
Based on its analysis of the severe stigmatic harm racial segregation 
inflicted on black schoolchildren, the Court concluded that "in the field 
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."20 
"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,"29 and, therefore, 
"segregation is a denial of equal protection of the la\>vs.":\il 
The Court's narrow focus on segregation's effects on equal educational 
opportunity has profoundly shaped the sub:.equent legal discourse on 
Brown's meaning. To this day, debates over Brown's substance focus on 
the soundness of the (~ourt's reasoning regarding the harmful 
" Id. 

" Id. 

'·' Id. at 493-96 

" Id. at 493-504 

' See genera/I_~ Kevin BroY..'n, TI1e Ruad !>.lot Tt1ki'n 111 Brown: Recognizing tiu' Dual Harm 
r!f Segregation, 90 VA. L. REV 1579 (2004); John D. C.:isa1s, ignoring U1e Harm: lhe S11preme 
Cmir/, Stigmatic h>jury, and the Fnd of School Vesegregatiun, 14 B.C. T1nRD \VORLD L.]. 259 
(1994); john Hart Elv, If al First You Dun'! Succeed, Ignore 111" Question l'Y'ext Time' Group 
11arm 1n l::lrown v. Hoard of Fdu<:"ation and Loving v. V1rgin1a, 15 CDNSJ. CDMM~'-'T. 215 
(1998) (an.ilyzing nature of ~tigrnatic harm in Brown and Loving); frank I. Goodman, De 
Factu Sclwol Segregatwn: A Constitutional and [mpinca/ Analysis, 6D CAL. L. REV. 275 (1972); 
Jeffr<;<y J. l.et'Ch, B11sing 115 II fudici11/ Remedy: A Socm-1.egul Reapprai~a/, 6 INDIANA I, RFV 71() 
(1973}. 
" Rrown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
Id 

" Id. at 495. 

"' Id. 

"' Id. 
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educational effects of racial segregation on black schoolchildren. Brown's 
critics question whether racial segregation causes such psychological 
harm and whether integrated schools in fact provide black students with 
better educational opportunities. Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, 
has questioned whether integration actually promotes black 
schoolchildren's Jearning.31 He suggests that there is an tmderlying 
assumption of black inferiority in the integrationist belief that they must 
to sit next to white children in order to become better students.'i Critical 
race theorist Derrick Bell has even suggested that black children might 
have been better served had the Court required the equalization of 
school resources, rather than racial integratinn.13 
Thus, the focus on Brown's educational and pedagogical implications 
narrows our understanding of racial segregation. Tt diverts our attention 
away from how racial segregation in public schools concerns more than 
just education and race. Tn particular, Brown's narrov.' focus on race and 
education prevents us from llllderstanding racial segregation as 
antimiscegenation. 
II. Al\TIMISCFGI:NA-1101' LAWS AND THE PRESERVATION OF WHITE 

RAC!Al. PURITY 

In addition to the racial segregation of public schools, another 
fundamental aspect of Jim Crow society was the social and legal 
prohibition of interracial relationships and interracial marriages. 
Antimiscegenation laws in the United States date back to the colonial 
era.'l4 Aimed at preserving the racial purity of the white race/5 they 
prevented interracial couples from marrying and producing legitimate, 
racially mixed children.36 Racially mixed children threatened white 
supremacy. A large number of such children would destabilize a system 
of racial apartheid premised on keeping social relations between whites 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114-38 (1995) (Thomas,]., concurring). 
" Id. 
Derrick Bell, >Upra not<e 14, at 350-51. 
See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 747-48 (1948}; RACHl:.L F_ MORAN, 
]'>/TERRAC!AL ll\TIJ\1ACY. Tl!E Rt:.GULAllON OF RACF AC\'D ROMA'JCE, 17-42 (2001); Judy 
Scales-Trent, Ranul Piinty Law> in. the Umted States and .'-.faz1 Germany: Tlie Turget111g Prores:;, 
23 HUM. Rrs. Q. 2.'i9, 272 {2001). 
'; See, e.g., loving v. Virginia, 388 L: S 1, 7 (1967); !\"aim v. Nairn, 87 S.E.Zd 749, 756 
(Va_ 1955); (;reen v. State, 58 A!a. 190, 194 (1877); Sclltt v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869); cf­
Statev Jackson,80Mo 175, 177(1883). 
-~ Scales-Trent, supra n<-1te 34, at 273. 
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and blacks separate and distinct.37 A social system based on preserving 
\vhite privilege and supremacy must maintain clear bonndaries between 
white and nonwhite pcoplc.38 Racially mixed children make it harder to 
preserve such racial boundaries.'9 Moreover, the fear of racially mixed 
children was rooted in eugenics-based beliefs that "'race crossing' 
produced forms of 'racial degeneration,' including infertility."40 
These concerns were evident in the Virginia Supreme Court decision, 
Nairn v. Nairn," which upheld the constitutionality of the state's 
prohibition against interracial marriage. Virginia's statute made it 
unlawful "for any white person in [that] state to marry any save a white 
person."42 In Nairn, a white woman sued to annul her marriage to her 
Chinese American husband.'3 Although both were Vir3inia residents, 
the couple had traveled to North Carolina to marry. The statute, 
however, also prohibited Virginia residents from getting married in 
another state solely to avoid the antimiscegenation statute and did not 
consider such marriages legal in Virginia.1·1 Subsequently, when the wife 
sought an annulment in the Virginia courts, she argued that the marriage 
was in contravention of the State's antimiscegenation statute and 
therefore void from its inception."" 
The Virginia Supreme Court annulled the marriage and upheld the 
statute's constitutiona!ity.47 Moreover, the court explained the purpose 
behind the antirniscegenation law - preserving white racial purity ­
and affirmed its legitimacy.48 It stated: "The preservation of racial 
integrity is the unquestioned policy of this State, and that it is sound and 
wholesome, cannot be gainsaid. "49 The court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment permits states to enact legislation seeking to preserve racial 
integrity: 
" Id. at 271 
" Id. See gnierally !AN F. HA"1EY-L0PEZ, Wurni BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTJON OF 
RACE (1996) (exploring social and, sp<'cifically, l<'gal origins of white racial identity). 
" Scales-Trent, supra note 34, at 273. 
" Id. 
" 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va 1955). 

" Id. at 750 (quoting VA. CODE AC-:N. §§ 20-54 (1960)). 

" Id. 

Id. 

" Id. at 751. 

" Id. at 750-51 

" Id. at 755-56. 

"' Id. 

Id at 751. 
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We arc unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution ... any words or any intendment which prohibit the 
State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its 
citit:ens, or which denies the power of the State to regulate the 
marriage relation so that it shall not have a mongrel breed of 
citizens. We find there is no requirement that the State shall not 
legislate to prevent the obliteration of racial pride, but must permit 
the corruption of blood even though it weaken or destroy the 
quality of its citizenship. Both sacred and secular histories teach 
that nations and races have better advanced in human progress 
when they cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and 
culture and developed their own peculiar genius.'0 
The court emphasized the dangers that miscegenation posed for the 
white race and its racial purity. If a state permitted interracial marriages, 
mixed couples would reproduce and create a "mongrel breed of 
citizens," destroying white racial identity and corrupting the quality of 
the previously white citizenry. 
Although this Virginia Supreme Court decision was challenged to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the higher Court ultimately refused to hear the 
appeal, contending that the case failed to present a proper federal 
question.51 However, Nairn came to the Court in the year immediately 
following Brown. In all likelihood, the higher Court did not take the 
appeal largely because it did not want to address the politically 
incendiary issue of antimiscegenation.52 It was too soon after the Court 
had taken the monumental step of striking down racial segregation in 
public schools.51 
It was thirteen years after Brown when the U.S. Supreme Court finally 
held that antimiscegenation laws were unconstitutional.'"' In Loving v. 
Virginia, an interracial couple challenged the same Virginia statutory 
scheme at issue in Naim.55 The statute made it a felony for a white person 
to intermarry with a "colored person"·';/; and rendered void any marriage 
between "a white person and a colored person."07 However, \vhile the 
" Id. at 755-56. 
" Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956). 
" See Gregory Michael Dorr, Princ1plrd Expedirncy· Eugenics, Nairn v NJ.im, and tire 
Suprenie Court, 42 A:vl. J LEGAL HIST. 119, 120 {1998). 
" Supra note 52. 
" Loving v. V1rgmia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
" ld. at 2-7. 
"" Id at 4 (quoting VA. CODE A"IN. §§ 20-59 (1960)). 
" Id.; see VA. CODE AN:-J §§ 20-57 {1960). 
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statute required that white persons marry only other white persons, it 
permitted marriages between persons of different nonwhite racial 
groups.'~ For example, it prohibited \vhites from marrying nonwhites, 
but permitted Asian Americans to intermarry with African Americans. 
In a unanimous opinion, the Court struck down antimiscegenation 
laws for violating both the Equal Protcction19 and Due Process Clauses.60 
In its equal protection analysis, the Court stated that racial classifications 
are suspect, particularly in criminal statutes, and should be subject to 
rigorous judicial scrutiny.'1 The Court then outlined the modem strict 
scrutiny test and concluded that, for a racial classification to survive 
rigid judicial scrutiny, it "must be shown to be necessary to the 
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the 
racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to climinate.''1'2 Since Loving, the Court has adopted the rule 
that a racial classification will survive heightened judicial scrutiny only if 
it is narrowly tailored to serving a compelling state interest.r,i 
Applying "rigid scrutiny" in Loving, the Court examined Virginia's 
purported interest in prohibiting interracial marriages. It held that the 
state did not have any legitimate interest in enacting an 
antimiscegenation law."" 1n ascertaining Virginia's purpose in the law, 
the Court noted the Virginia Supreme Court's lower opinion's reference 
to Nairn v. Naim. 65 The Court quoted several passages from the Nairn 
decision asserting that Virginia legitimately sought to protect '"the racial 
integrity of citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel 
breed of citizen;,,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride."'M The Court, 
however, concluded that these stated justifications were "an 
endorsement of the doctrine of white supremacy" and not legitimate 
state intcrests."1 Accordingly, the Court held that antimiscegenation laws 
violated equal protection because it was an illegitimate tool "designed to 
maintain White Supremacy. "68 
" Lnmng, 388 US. at 12. 

" Id. 

"' Id. 

Id.all!. 
"' Id. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Califnrnia, 12.~ S. Ct. 1141, 1146 (2005). 
" Loving, 388 L.S. at 11. 
05 Id. at 7. 
"' Id. (quoting Nairn v. l\1aim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)). 
" Id. 
Id. at 11. 
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The Court also held that antimiscegenation laws violate substantive 
due process by infringing upon the fundamental right to marry.09 It 
declared that "marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' 
flllldamental to our very existence and survivaL"70 Moreover, denying 
that fundamental right on the basis of race de~rives "all of the State's 
citizens of liberty without due process of law." 1 The Court concluded 
that "[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a 
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be 
infringed by the State."72 
In Loving, the Court ultimately declared antimiscegenation laws 
unconstitutional because they infringed upon the fundamental right to 
marry in order to maintain a social system based on white supremacy.n 
Ilov-iever, the opinion fails to connect antimiscegcnation to racial 
segregation. A cursory reading of Loving and Brown thus suggests that 
there is no link between them beyond the fact that both deal ..vith racial 
discrimination against blacks. For the Court, Brown is a case about race 
and education, and Loving is a case about race and marriage. Ilowever, 
these issues directly implicate each other. Racial segregation and 
antimiscegenation practices were ultimately designed to further the 
same goal: to preserve white racial purity and maintain a social system 
of white supremacy. 
III. 	 RACIAL SEGREGATION AND ANTIMISCECEl\'ATION: WHAT LOVIl,iG I IAS 
TO Do WITI I BROWN 
Although the Brown decision focused on the educational detriment of 
racial segregation in public schools, segregation did not operate only to 
impede the educational opporhtnities of black students. It also 
functioned as an antimisccgenation policy. Its underlying purpose was 
to prevent the formation of interracial relationships in public schools and 
so prevent interracial marriages. 
Curiously, while much scholarship has been devoted to discussing 
Loving and Brown, very few law review articles analyze them jointly as 
cases dealing with antimiscegenation.74 Although both cases are 
Jd. at 12 

" ld. 

Id. 

Id. 

Jd.at11 
" See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964, 971-73 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing Lomn:g 
and /\'aim cases, and stating that purpobe of such statutes was to prot<,ct rad.ii purity); 
Robert A. Destrn, Ww an:d tile Politics of Marriage: Loving v Virginia Aftrr 30 Years 
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fundamentally about preservin~ white racial purity,75 scholars distinctly 
view Loving as a case about race 6 and the right to marry77 and Brown as a 
case about racial segregation in education.78 While antimiscegenation 
laws have been critically examined as tools to promote "white racial 
purity," there has been little commentary likewise examining racial 
segregation in public schools as a tool to prevent the development of 
interracial marriages.7' 
Scholarly discussion of the antimiscegenation policies underlying 
racial segregation is lacking. 1"his is partially because the Brou!n Court 
never considered racial purity as a state rationale for racially segregating 
public schools.t<J As discussed earlier, while the Brown Court argued at 
some length that racial segregation inflicted detrimental psychological 
harm on black schoolchildren, it did not inquire into the reason for 
racially segregating public schools. Why exactly did states force black 
/11/rod11ctim1, 47 CATH. LI. L REV. 1207, 1219-21 (1998) {stating purpose of law was 
pre~crving racial purity); J. Allen Douglas, The "Mos/ Valuuble Sort of Property'"· 
Constructin.1: White Identity 111 Amenam l.tiw, 1880-1940, 40 SAN D!EGO I •. REV. 881, 937 (2003); 
Ely, suprri not"' 25, at 216 (articul,1ting group-based harm theory that reconciles several 
m~jor Supr.,,me C<.1urt equal protection decisions), A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. 
Kopytoff, Racial Purity and lnlcrracial Sex in tire Uiw of Colonial and Antebellum V1rg1nw, 77 
GEO. L.J. 1967, 2021-22 (1989) (giving comprehPnbive histori'·"l o,·ervipw of mbcegen<Jtion 
st<Jlutcs); Scal<"s-Trent, supra nott> ::M, at 282-84 (noting that antimi~cegentltlon laws prohibit 
m~rriage bPtween membPrs of different "races"). 
" Ser Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So. 105, 108 (Miss. 1925). 
" For articles discussing the pqual protection andlybb in Lovi11g, s<c>e gerwrally Allison 
Moon,, !.oving's l~·gacy· T!1e Other Antidiscriminalion Principles, ::M HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
163 (1999) (arguing that true legacy of Loving is conct'ption of anl!discrimination principle 
m which Ja,v's neutrality between individuals ib not enough); Keith E Sealing, Blood Will 
Tell: Scwntific Raosm and the l.egal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
559 (2000) (reviewing history of antimiscegenation statutes}; Ronald Turner, Werr Separate­
but-l::qua/ and Antim1scegenation L11ws Cvnslit11t1onal?: Applying Scaluin Traditmnalism to 
Brown and Loving, 40 SAN OTEGO I.. REV 285 (2003) (applying Scalia'.~ traditionalism to 
Brou1n and Loving). 
n For article~ discus~ing Lovi11.1: as a case about the fundamental right to marry, se!o' 
generally Margaret F. Brmig, Tl1e Supreme Court's Impact on Marriag>', 1967-90, 411-low. L.]. 
271 (1998) (discussing Supr»me Court deci~ions on marriage from 6Ds to 90s); Robert I'. 
!Jrintln, S.J., !'he Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHJO Sr L.J. 358 (1968) 
(discussing Loving dec1s1on and right to marry); Mark Strasser, Loving, Bat'hr, and the Right 
to Marry: On l.eg11/ Argumentation a11d Soph1slica/ Rlieloric, 24 NOVA. L. REV. 769 {2000) 
(discussing ~tlmP ;.ex marriag"' and ,·onshtutional rights); Lynn D. Wardle, Lovmg v. 
Virginia and the Constitutional Righi to Marry, 1790-1990, 41 How. L.J. 289 (1998) (discussing 
same s.<>x m~rriage and its conshtutional issues in light of Loving). 
" See Klarman, supra note 10, at 238-39. 
'"' Sre Jo.,ephine Ross, Tl1e Sexua/izalion of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed-Race and 
Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HAl(V. C.R.-C.I.. L. REV. 255, 268 (2002) (discussing bri~fly racial 
s.<>gregat1on in public schools as tool to prevent development of interracial relationships). 
"' Bro;vn v Rd. of Educ., 347 U.S 483, 483 (1954). 
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and white children to attend different schools? As it never mentioned 
any possible justifications for school segregation, the Court consequently 
never examined whether they were legitimate and justifiable. Instead, 
the Court focused its analysis solely on how racial segregation denied 
black children an equal educational opportunity.81 
A. Rice v. Gong Lum 
One case that explicitly discusses the rationale behind racial 
segregation in public schools is the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision 
in R.ice v. Gong Lum.01 Evident in this court's reasoning was that the 
prevention of interracial marriages and racial amalgamation was a 
fundamental policy underlying racial segregation in public schools. Jn 
Gong Lum, the court had to determine whether a Chinese American girl 
born in the United States should be required to attend the white public 
school or the black public school.83 The Mississippi State Constitution 
required that public schools be segregated between whites and colored 
people.s. The issue in Gong Lum, therefore, was whether a Chinese 
American student was white or colored under the Mississippi 
Constitution.85 The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Chinese 
American student was "colored" for constihttional purposes and that if 
she wanted to attend public school, she must attend the all black public 
school.86 
In reaching its holding, the court relied on Mississippi's 
antirniscegenation statute to conclude that Chinese Americans should be 
considered "colored" for purposes of school segregation.87 The 
antimiscegenation stahtte explicitly prohibited interracial marriage 
between whites and the "Mongolian race."118 The court then explained 
the underlying purpose of both the segregation and antimiscegenation 
statutes: 
To all persons acquainted with the social conditions of this state and 
of the Southern states generally it is well known that it is the earnest 
desire of the white race to preserve its racial integrity and purity, 
" Id at 492. 

"' Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So. 105 (Mbs. 1925). 

~' Id. 

"' Id. at 107 {quoting M!SS. CO/\'ST. OF 1890, § 207). 

" Id. 

"'ld.at110. 
" Id. at 1D8. 
Id. 
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and to maintain the purity of the social relations as far as it can be 
done by law. It is known that the dominant purpose of the two 
sections of the Constitution of our state was to preserve the integrity 
and purity of the white race. When the public school system was 
being created it was intended that the white race should be 
separated from all other races. '" 
For the court, racially segregating public schools was a legitimate way to 
preserve white racial purity.w The court asserted: "Taking all of the 
provisions of the law together, it is manifest that it is the policy of this 
state to have and maintain separate schools and other places of 
association for the races so as to prevent race amalgamation."91 
Moreover, "(r]ace amalgamation has been frowned on by Southern 
civilization always, and our people have always been of the opinion that 
it was better for all races to preserve their racial purity."92 
What did the Mississippi Supreme Court mean when it spoke of "race 
amalgamation"? The amalgamation of the races concerned more than 
members of different racial groups simply interacting together in schools 
and other places of association. The court's concern with preventing race 
amalgamation was ultimately about preventing the development of 
intimate sexual and romantic relationships between whites and 
nonwhites.93 Unless schools were kept strictly segregated, white and 
colored students would have continuous and regular social contact with 
each other. This contact would erode notions of racial pride and racial 
consciousness among whites. Inevitably, intimate interracial relations 
would develop, inexorably leading to interracial marriage and the 
production of racially mixed children. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court, unlike the Brown Court, did not 
mention any pedagogical rationales in discussing the policies underlying 
racial segregation in public schools.~ Rather, the court only discussed 
the vital function that segregation of public schools played in preventing 
the later development of interracial marriages and thereby preserving 
the purity of the white race.95 Thus, for the Mississippi Supreme Court, 
racial segregation in public schools did not primarily serve an 
educational function. Racial segregation in public schools served an 
" Id. 
"' Td. 

" Jd.atlIO. 

" Id. 

" Id. at 108; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967). 

"' Rice, 104So.at110. 

" Id. 
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antimiscegenation purpose: to prevent the formation of interracial 
relationships in order to preserve white racial purity and maintain white 
supremacy.;; 
B. Historical Attitudes Toward Racial Segregation 
Historical evidence also suggests that the Mississippi Supreme Court 
was correct when it asserted: 
To all persons acquainted with the social conditions of this ::.tatc and 
of the Southern states generally it is well known that it is the earnest 
desire of the white race to preserve its racial integrity and purity, 
and to maintain the purity of the social relations as far as it can be 
done by law." 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whites throughout 
the United States viewed racial segregation in public schools as an 
important tool for ensuring the purity of the vvhite race.'~ In 1860, the 
California state legislature passed a law which prohibited racial minority 
groups from attending school with white children.99 A California 
newspaper printed an editorial piece supporting the segregation law, 
praising the law's ability to "keep our public schools free from the 
intrusion of the inferior races."1 N' It emphasized the antimiscegenation 
purposes of racially segregating schoolchildren: 
If we are compelled to have t'\1cgrocs and Chinamen among us, it i::. 
better, of course, that they should be educated. But teach them 
separately from our own children. let us preserve our Caucasian 
blood pure. We want no mongrel race of moral and mental hybrids 
to people the mountains and valleys of California. 101 
Thus, the desire to racially segregate public schools was intrinsically 
linked with the desire to prevent the development of sexual relationships 
between whites and people of color. This would ultimately prevent 
"" Id. 

" Id at 108. 

'" Ser LJougl.is, supra note 74, at 937 (discussing 19th <l'ntury -;talP laws n·quiring 

"absolute prohibition of rarial intrrrnixing in schools"}; Herbert Ravenel Sass, 1\11xed Srhoo/,; 
and M>:ted Blood, 198 ATLAN"I IC :'v!ONTl !Ly 45, 48 ( l 956). 
"' Sei' Joyce Kuo, f.xc/uded, Segrexated and f'orgotten: A H1;;torica! View of the 
Discrimination of C!1inese Americans 1n Public Schools, 5 AS!AC\i L J. 181, 190 (1998}. 
Id. 

"' Id. 
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interracial couples from creating a "mongrel race of moral and mental 
hybrids." iui 
School segregation was an important element in preserving white 
racial purity because of the vital role that schools play in socializing 
children. Schools not only impart knowledge, but also indoctrinate 
values and beliefs in impressionable young children. Moreover, during 
the course of a person's childhood, schooling is a significant aspect of 
life. A child will spend the majority of each year in school, being 
socialized not only through classroom teaching but also through 
interaction with his or her schoolmates. Accordingly, people feared the 
power of schools to break down racial beliefs among children and 
promote racial mixing.103 As Professor Josephine Ross asserts: "In the 
segregated South, parents feared that their children would themselves 
'fall prey' to interracial relationships as they grew into adolescents, 
thereby becoming impure themselves."104 
Given that elementary level children are highly impressionable and 
subject to teachers' and peers' influence, white Southerners saw public 
schools as key social institutions for inculcating racial consciousness in 
whites and blacks.1re White children and children of color needed to be 
taught at an early age that they should not mix or socialize. 106 The 
development of white racial consciousness through racially segregated 
schools ensured that white children grew up to maintain equal social 
relations only with other whites and not "fall prey" to interracial 
relationships. 1w Hence, white Southerners supported racially segregated 
public schools because they firmly believed that "the key to the 
schoolroom door is the key to the bedroom door."108 Ironically, the 
importance of schools as social spaces for transmitting racial attitudes is 
reflected in the Brown Court's observation that "the socialization process 
of schooling can affect the hearts and minds of children in a way that 
cannot ever be undone. "109 
"" ld. 
"" See Sass, supra note 98, at 48. 
'"' Ross, supra note 79, at 268. 
'"' See Sass, supra note 98, at 48. 
'"' Id. 
10
' ld. 
'"' Ross, supra note 79, at 268 (quoting CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM: 
THE EMOTIONAL BARRIER TOAN INTEGRATEDSOCIEI'Y 15 (1976)). 
'"' Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
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Moreover, when Brown was decided, Southerners who immediately 
denOW1ced the Brown decision understood that it had implications 
beyond the educational context. 1 ia They quickly protested the decision as 
the first step in a "social program for the amalgamation of the two 
races."
111 1·he Daily News of Jackson, Mississippi, reacted to Brown with 
similar fears: "White and Negro children in the same schools will lead to 
miscegenation. Miscegenation leads to mixed marriages and mixed 
marriages lead to mongrelization of the human race."1n 
Understanding the fierce Southern resistance to racially integrating 
schools requires acknowledgement that the battle involved more than 
children's formal education. Rather, at the heart of this fierce resistance 
was the belief that racial segregation as a whole, and school segregation 
in particular, was the structural foundation for a way of life based on 
notions of white racial supremacy. As one Southern segregationist 
asserted, the object of racial segregation was to "prevent the two races 
from meeting on terms of social equality.'' 111 Southerners believed that 
"racial segregation [was] necessary to preserve racial integrity"ii4 and 
therefore believed that racial integration in public schools was one of the 
greatest threats to that white racial purity. 11 ' The preservation of white 
supremacy depended nn the preservation of racial segregation.116 
C. Racial Segregation as Antimiscegenation 
Once racial segregation in public schools is viewed as a tool to protect 
white racial purity and supremacy, the connection bet>veen racial 
segregation and antimiscegenation laws becomes clear. By preventing 
the early development of social relations between white and black 
schoolchildren, racially segregated public schools decreased the 
likeliliood that such children would later consider dating and marrying 
each other. Antimiscegenation laws may prohibit whites and blacks 
from marrying each other, but they cannot prevent the formation of the 
"' See Sa~~, s1,pra note 98, at 46-47; see also THFODORF (;. Bii.BO, TAKl YOL'R CHOJCE: 
Stl'ARATION OR MOKGRlLlZATID"I 55 (1947) (arguing racial segregation neces~ary to 
pre~erve integrity of 'lvhit<C race). 
"' Reva B. Siegt'l, !::.quality Talk· Anl1su/!ordmafion and Anticlassification Value; in 
Cons/1tutiona/ Struggles over Brovvn, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1482 {2004). 
'" Id. 
BJUJO, >upra note 110, at 49. 
"' Id. 
"' See Rice v. Cong Lum, 104 So 10.~. 110 {Mi.~~- 1925); Sa~~' supra note 98, at 48. 
See ll!LllO, supra note 110, at 55 (arguing intPgration of races 'lvould m<'aII '"the 
~outhern whit<C ra.ce, the Southern Caucabian, would be irretrievably doomed"). 
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romantic connections that lead to the desire to intermarry. This was left 
to such mechanisms as racial segregation in the public schools and other 
places where interracial social relations could potentially develop. The 
segregation of public accommodations,117 transportation,us restaurants,119 
beaches/w and swinuning pools1' 1 can all be viewed as tools for 
eliminating sites of potential development of intimate interracial 
relations. For Southern segregationists, physical separation was 
absolutely critical to preventing the amalgamation of the races. "Unless 
the races are physically separated, [racial mixing] will continue until 
amalgamation has reached such a point that racial lines no longer 
exist."122 
Understanding racial segregation in public schools as a tool for 
preserving white racial purity also helps contextualize its stigmatic 
harms.123 The Court in Brown focused primarily on how racial 
segregation denied black schoolchildren equal educational opportunities 
by instilling in them a sense of racial inferiority and diminishing their 
ability to learn.124 The Court, however, failed to recognize that this sense 
of inferiority also impeded the development of equal social relations 
between blacks and whites. Racial segregation not only taught black 
children that they were academically inferior to whites, but that they 
were socially inferior. As social inferiors, they did not deserve to develop 
equal intimate relations with whites. 
Moreover, the Court failed to recognize that racial segregation 
reinforces white supremacy by teaching white children that blacks are 
intellectually and socially inferior to them.125 Through racial segregation, 
white children were given the "subtlest form of human flattery - their 
"' See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) {racially 
segregated hotels). 
"' See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (racially segregated railroad passenger 
cars). 
"' See Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (racially segregated public 
restaurants). 
'" See Dawson v. Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (racially segregated public 
beaches and bathhouses). 
"' See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (racially segregated public swimming 
pools). 
'"' BILBO, supra note 110, at 222. 
'" See MORAN, supra note 34, at 17-18 (discussing how antimiscegenation laws' were 
"used lo establish norms about race" and effects of those norms on blacks and Asians, 
specifically "intense racialization and entrenched inequality."). 
'" Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
'" See id. al 493-94 (lacking discussion of effect of racial segregation on white 
schoolchildren). 
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social superiority over masses of other human bcings." 126 V\Thite children 
were taught from an early ape that they should not develop equal 
intimate relations with blacks.1' The racial segregation of public schools 
resulted in both races learning that they should not develop equal social 
relations with each other. It was thereby less likely that they would 
develop equal or intimate relationships as adults. 12B White racial purity 
was preserved by affecting the hearts and minds of white children as 
well as the hearts and minds of black children. 
How racial segregation instilled a sense of inferiority in black children 
and a sense of superiority in white children, therefore, played a critical 
part in preserving a social system premised on white supremacy. In this 
system, whites maintained their racial purity, and the privileges, powers, 
and stahts that went along with their whiteness.129 J{acial segregation as 
an antimiscegenation tool was central to the maintenance of \vhite 
supremacy. 
IV. 	 RE-CONCEPTCALIZ!NG RACIAL 5Ec;REGATJON: RACIAL SEGREGATION 
AS GE::-.JDER SEGREGATION (1\J THE BASTS OF RACE 
Clarifying the connection betvveen racial segregation in public schools 
and Jav-ls prohibiting interracial marriage reveals how Jim Crow 
apartheid regulated both gender relations and race relations. Protecting 
white supremacy required preventing the development of interracial 
relationships and mixed-raced children. Accordingly, Jim Crow states 
strictly regulated intimate relations between males and females on the 
basis of their race. Jim Crow operated to keep white women from black 
men, and white men from black women. Therefore, the practice of 
physically separating the races can be understood, not just as "racial 
segregation," but as "gender segregation on the basis of race." Viewed 
this \Vay, Brown involves more than just equal educational opportunity 
and race. Along with racial equality, it deals \Vith issues of gender 
equality. 
Esst·ntialist language and language structure has helped obscure the 
gendered naturf:-' of racial segregation. When we use "race" as lens 
'" Amii Larkin B<1rnard, The Apphcution of Critical Ra~e remini:.m to the Anl1·Ly11cl1i11x 
lVfvueme11t· Black Women's Fight Against Race and Cend1'r Ideology 1892-1920, 3 UCLA 
WO\fE'J'~ L.j. 1, 2 (1993). 
'" See BILBO, oupra note 110, at 49. 
"' See Ro""· supra note 79, dt 260-61 (dbC"ussing black men ,1nd wom"n treated as sexual 
objects but not as potential nlarnage partners). 
' 
19 51'e Cheryl Harns, W!11teness as Properly, 106 I !ARV. L. REV. 1707, 1752 (1993) 
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through which we analyze "racial segregation," the language of race 
inevitably narrows our focus. We concentrate solely on racial issues and 
divert our attention from gender issues. Taking an anti-essentialist 
linguistic approach to legal discourse helps uncover the relationships 
between race and gender. It can help scholars better understand the 
multidimensional nature of racial segregation in particular and racial 
subordination in general. 
A. Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism 
In Critical Race Feminist theory, "[e]sscntialism is the notion that there 
is a single woman's, or Black person's, or any other group's, experience 
that can be described independently from other aspects of the person ­
that there is an essence to that experience." 130 Essentialist beliefs about 
groups and group experience "assumes that the experience of being a 
member of the group under discussion is a stable one, one with a clear 
meaning, a meaning constant through time, space, and different 
historical, social, political, and personal contexts."01 The problem with 
essentialist beliefs is that they limit our perspective on social reality. 
Making assumptions about an "essential woman's experience" tends to 
exclude the experiences of women who do not fit the characteristics of 
the "essential woman."132 
In Critical Race Feminist theory, anti-essentialism is a tool for 
critiquin§ and deconstructing essentialist notions of racial and gender 
identity. 1 3 Anti-essentialism seeks to "define complex experiences as 
" 
0 Trina GrillD, Anli-Essentiali>m and Intersectionality: Toolo lo Dismantle the Master's 
}louse, 10 BERK!:LEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 19 (1995). 
'" Id. 
"' Id. at 19-20. 
'" See generally Robert S. Chang & l\Tatasha Fuller, Rotating Centers, [xparrding Frontiers. 
LiltCrit Theory and MJJrginal lnlerse(f10ns Performing LatCrit, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. RFV 1277 
(2000) (introducing Sumi Cho and Robert W"'~tl"'y's analysis of anti-essenti;ilist theory a~ it 
limits political organi.-:.ition as onP d1meIL~1on in an effectivE" antisubord1nationist praxis); 
Sumi Chn & Rl1bt'rt Westley, Critical Mee Cualitions: Key lvlovements that Performed the 
Theory, 33 U.C. lJAVIS L. REV. 1377 (2000) (arguing that anti-ess.entiali~t movement hinders 
political organization ab it contributes to deronstruction of minonty group to disunited 
individuals); Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-[ssentialisl and Social Constructionist 
Argun!l"nls in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629 (2002) (exploring possibloc effects of litigating from 
anti-es~entiahst stand;ird rathtc'r than ~ocial constructionist standard in individual 
discrimination suit); Crillo, supra note 130, at 19; Angela P Harris, Race and Eosen!ialism in 
Femini;/ Legal Theory, 42 s·1AN. L. RFV. 581, 585 (1990); Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Fssentml1om, 
Relativism and Human Rig/its, 19 HARV WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1996) (~uggesting that feminist~ 
must n'spond to anti-essentialist arguments d.~ ii relattc's to cultural differences while 
recognizing that global women's oppression takeb many forms); Elizabeth M. Iglesias & 
Francisco Valde~, Expanding D1recfions, Explud1ng l'aramefers: C11lt1.ae and Nation in LatCnf 
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closely to their full complexity as possible." 134 Anti-essentialism contends 
that people and experiences are too complex, dynamic, and historically 
and spatially situated to be thought of as possessing fixed and stable 
attributes. 135 Rather, anti-essentialism posits that categories such as 
"woman" and "black" or "Asian" are socially constructed categories and 
do not possess any essential or fundamental attributes.1"0 Thus, Critical 
Race Feminists have criticized some feminist theories for being 
essentialist in that they reflect only the experiences of white, middle­
class, heterosexual women when describing "the woman's" experience. 
As a result, these theories exclude and marginalize the experiences of 
women of color, lesbians, and poor women.n7 
B. Anti-Essentialist Linguistics115 
Just as anti-esscntialism is a tool for critiquing inadequate feminist 
theories, it is also a tool for examining language and language structures. 
It allows us to analyze how language shapes our understanding of law, 
legal discourse, and social reality. Anti-cssentialism is concerned with 
the relationship between law, language, thought, and the social 
Coalitional lnwgina/1(m, 5 MICH ). RACE & l. 787 (2000) (advocating use of anti-€~t.entialisrn 
in LatCrit th.,nry), .l:lizabeth M. Iglesia~, Out of Thr S!mdow: Marking lntersrctions In and 
Between Asian Pacific Amencan Critical Legal Scholarship and L:iti110/o Cririca/ Legal Theory, 40 
B.C L. RFV 349, 374-77 (1998) (udvocating u~e of anh-ess<>ntialism in joint collaboration 
between LatC:nt and APACrit ventures); .l:Jiz,,beth M. lgl..,sias & Francisni Valdes, Religwn, 
Gender. Sexuality, Race and Class in Coalitiorwl Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Ana/y;is of 
LllfCrif Social J11>t1ce Agendas, 19 CHICAl\."O-LATil\"O L. REV. 503 (1998) (urging f~,tCrit 
theorists to use anti-e~senliahst theory as it pertain~ lo role of religion in Latin;i/o 
communities}; Alisa D. Nave, Feminist Legal T!1eory. An Anti-I:sserliialist Reader, 19 
llF.RKhlFY WOMF.t\'S L.J 313 (2004) (summarizing und reviewing anti-<esS€ntialism as 
advocated in collection of artid.,s); Francisco Valdes, Theorizing "()ulCrit" Theories: 
Coalitional Method arid Comparative jurisprudentiill Experience - RaceCrits , QueerCrits and 
Lll!Crit.1, 53 U. 'vl!AMT L. RFV. 126.) (1999) (outlining role that anti-essentialism has had for 
RaceCrits, QueerCrits, and LutCrits), Jane Wong, The Antiessentialism v F.;sentialism Debate 
111 Feminist Legal T/1eory: Ti1e Debate and Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273 (1999) 
(studying law reform through dichotomy of es;.entialism and anti-€ssentialism as it 
pertains to femiru;;t legal theory). 
'"' Grillo, sHpra note 130, at 22. 

'" Seeid.at19. 

"' Sre Harrb, ;upra note 133, at 585. 

"' Sre id. 

"" l discuss the concept of an anll-essentidhst linguistic anulysis of law in greater depth 

m two oth<er articles. See Reginald Oh, A Critical Linguistic Analysis of F.qual Protection 
DocJrinr: Are Whites a Suspect Class? 13 TEMP. PUL. & CIV RTS. L REV. 583 (2004); R~ginald 
Oh, Discrimination and Distrust: A Critical Linguistic Analysis of the Discrimi11afion Concept, 7 
U. PA.). CONST. L. 837 (2005). 
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construction of reality. 139 The fundamental premise underlying an anti­
essentialist approach to the study of law and language is that "the 
structure of a human being's language influences the manner in which 
he understands reality and behaves \vith respect to it." 140 The language 
we use to define certain experiences shapes our understanding of those 
experienccs. 141 Thus, an anti-essentialist approach to ]aw and language 
asserts that language structure reflects a view of the world and the 
nature of reality. 1' 2 Therefore, changing the language we use to describe 
a social reality can transform our W1derstanding of that social reality. 14 -1 
linguists contend that the English language reproduces an essentialist 
understanding of reality.1"' The I'.nglish language embraces the view that 
things possess an essential or ultimate nature.'" The essentialism 
underlying language presumes a static view of reality and the world.1"" 
If a thing has a property by virtue of its essential nature, then under an 
essentialist view, that thing will always possess that particular property 
or essence. '" 
On the other hand, an anti-essentialist approach to language takes a 
process-oriented approach to understanding reality. 148 Contrary to 
essentialism, it presumes that there is no "objective or essential" reality. 
Instead, it presumes that "reality" is socially constructed through an 
interaction betvveen subject and object. 14g This approach to language 
presumes that words and C"ategories are not objective, but rather are 
subjective, culturally contingent constructs that reflect, shape, and 
'"' 8!:-'JAJ\11-' LE!: VVHORF, LAl\GUACE, T!!OUGl-ll, A"iD REALl!Y 23, 59 Uohn B. Carrol 
ed., M.J.T. Press 1964) (1956). 
'~' ld. at 23. 
"' /\NATO!. RAPOPORT, OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY· INTEGRATING KNOWI.EDCF Al\D 
ACTID"i 23.~ (1969). 
"' See, e.g., RICHARD BA/\ULER & JoH:-J GRIKLJER, Tl!!: STRL'CTURF OF MAGIC' A BooK 
AROUr IANGUAGE AC'JD THERAPY 21-22 (197S) (stating that humiln~ use language to 
rt>pr<'~ent anJ model experience>); WENLJELL JOH-'S<:JN, Pl:Ol'LE IN QUANLJAR!ES: TJJE 
SEMAl\TIC~ OF PtRSONAL ALJJt.:Sl.\1ENT 112-42 (1946) ("The relationship between language 
,u1d re;ility is a strucft1ral relation~hip."). See gnierally S.I l!AYAKA\NA, LA1':C:UAGt 1'-" 
THOLGl!T ,\ND ACI"ION 156 (1978) ("But as \Ve know from ev.,ryday exp.,rience, learning 
language is not simply a matter of learning \Vords, it is a matter of correctly relatmg our 
,vords to the things and happenings for \vhich they stand."). 
'" JOHNSON, oupra note 142, at 28 
Id. at 7. 
"' /d.at6-10 
,. Id. at 83. 
Id. at 121-22 
Id at 83. 
Id. at 144-45.'" 
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influence how we undf'rstand the world. 15D 
To better understand how language can reduce our understanding of 
complex, interconnected systems into overly simple and reductionistic 
categories, it is necessary to explain two key premises of an anti­
essentialist analysis of law and language. 
The first premise to an anti-essentialist linguistic analysis is the 
principle of non-identity, which can be summed up in the statement," A 
is not A." 151 In other words, the premise of non-identity states that there 
is a fundamental difference between a word and the object that word 
n
represents. ° For example, we clearly understand that the word 
"hamburger" is something entirely different from the object 
"hamburger." 153 Thus, we do not eat a menu with the word 
"hamburger" printed on it because we know that would not be the same 
as achlally biting into a hamburger. 1'4 
Once we understand that a word is fundamentally different than the 
object represented by the word, the fact that classification is a 
fundamentally subjective, not objective, process becomes clear.'-'-' As 
Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner assert: "To put something in a 
category is to assign it a meaning, to place it in a particular context of 
particular ideas." 15" When humans attempt to give meaning to objects by 
classifying them, political, psychological, epistemological, sociological, 
and ideological motivations inevitably underlie such a process. 157 
Thus, when we "classify" the act of physically separating black and 
white children as "racial segregation," the underlying essentialist 
presumption is that the term "racial segregation" objectively defines that 
real world practice. We implicitly assume that "racial segregation" is the 
only term that describes that practice. We confuse the term "racial 
segregation" with the historical experience we are describing with that 
term, thus violating the anti-essentialist principle that "A is not A." We 
forget that classifying is a subjective, not objective, experience. 
Even though the act of naming is dependent on a subjective frame of 
reference, the abstract nature of classifying tends to mislead us into 
believing that categories or names are objective in nature. The reality is, 
'" Id. 
'·" Id.at171-72 
"' Id. at 177 . 
.;, Id. 
"' Id. 

'" A/\J"THONY G AMSTl:ROAM & JEROME BRUN!:R, Mil\lJING Tl !F. LAW 28 {2000). 

.~. Id. 

"' Id. 
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however, that someone has to classify an experience or object into a 
category and that different people can classify a particular object 
differently. Thus, because of the inherently subjective nature of 
classifying or naming, sociologist Anselm Strauss contends that "[t]he 
way in which things are classed together reveals, graphically as well as 
symbolically, the perspectives of the classifier."158 Similarly, Amsterdam 
and Bruner assert "[C]ategori.zation is not only an act of reference, 
specifying what the thing in question is, but also an act of sense rnaking, 
specifying how the category that includes this thing fits into our larger 
picture of the Shape of Things."159 
To illustrate the subjective nature of classifying, Strauss provides the 
example of the Laplanders, a Swedish cultural group who use the same 
word to describe both people and reindeer. 1 From an "objective" point61] 
of vie\.v, a person might contend that the Laplanders are incorrect to call 
reindeer "people," since based on objective criteria, reindeer clearly are 
not human beings. Strauss argues that debating this is pointless. From 
an anti-essentialist perspective, there is no such thing as a right or wrong 
answer to the question whether a reindeer is really a person. Rather, the 
Laplander example illustrates the culturally contingent, subjective nature 
of classification. 
The life of the Laplander revolves around activities having to do 
with reindeer. Is a reindeer a human or is a human a reindeer? . 
[T]he people and the reindeer are identified, go together, and the 
very fact of their identification in terminology gives the 
anthropologist one of his best clues to the Laplander's ordering of 
the world and it::. object::..1"1 
Finally, an anti-essentialist analysis of language is conscious of the 
way in which words direct action and attention toward certain situations and 
objects.102 As Anselm Strauss asserts: "The naming of an object provides 
a direction for action. ,,io.> For example, if one were to classify a person as 
a "liar," then one would likely treat anything uttered by the "liar" with 
skepticism and wariness. On the other hand, if one were to classify a 
person as an "honest man," one would likely treat anything uttered by 
\5S An.~elm Strauss, Language and Identity, in Tr!~ PROULCrlO'>: 01' REAl.IIY: ESSAYS A.'\10 
READl'>JGS IN 5cx::JAL PSYCHOLOC.Y 74 (Peter Kollock & Jodi O'Brien eds., 1994). 
'" AMSfERDAM & BRU'>:ER, supra note 155, at 28-29. 
'" Strauss, supra note 158, at 74. 
'" Id. 

"' Id. at 73. 

,., Id. at 75. 
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the "honest man" with greater trust and open-mindedness. When we 
rename an object, person, or a situation, "[t]he renaming of any object, 
then, amounts to a reassessment of your relation to it, and ipso facto 
your behavior becomes changed along the line of your reassessment." 1M 
An anti-essentialist analysis of law and language helps us better 
understand the full complexities of subordination. Specifically, an anti­
essentialist linguistic analysis seeks to develop alternative names or 
classifications to describe certain experiences. These alternatives redirect 
our attention, allowing us to see the full complexity of the reality behind 
a word. Thus, renaming "racial segregation" helps us realize the 
multidimensional nature of racial segregation - particularly how racial 
segregation in public schools involves more than just race and education. 
C. An Anti-Essentialist Analysis of Racial Segregation Discourse 
As discussed earlier, racial segregation in public schools operated as 
an antimiscegenation tool by making it more difficult for white and black 
children to develop intimate relationships with one another. Once the 
colUleCtion between racial segregation and antimiscegenation is made, 
the gendered nature of racial segregation becomes clear. To function as 
an antimiscegenation tool, racial segregation had to divide children 
alor.g both racial and gender Jines. VVhen a state segregated th!;' white 
and black races, its specific goal was to separute (1) white women from 
black men and (2) white men from black women. The term "racial 
segregation," however, fails to capture the gendered sorting that occurs 
through segregation. Thus, armed with the anti-essentialist 
understanding that a word does not objectively describe a social practice, 
to fully describe how racial segregation also regulated gender relations, 
we could rename "racial segregation" as "gender segregation on the 
basis of race." 
How does our analysis of racial segregation change when we think of 
it as gender segregation on the basis of race? Gender segregation on the 
basis of race means that all white males are kept apart from all black 
females and all white females are kept apart from all black males. Using 
the lens of race and gender, our attention shifts away from the purely 
racial aspects of segregation to how it also simultaneously structures 
relationships on the basis of gender. Physically separating males and 
females on the basis of their race prevented the de,relopment of social, 
romantic, or sexual relations between white men and black women and 
·" Id. 
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betvveen white women and black men. Par racial segregation to operate 
as an antimiscegenation tool, it had to regulate whites and blacks along 
gender lines. The purpose of antimiscegenation was to prevent men and 
women of different races from marrying each other and producing 
racially mixed children. "fhus, when viewing segregation through the 
lens of race and gender, we can more easily see that the regulation of 
gender relations v.'as a critical and fWldamental aspect of the regulation 
of race relations. 
Analyzing Jim Crow segregation as gender segregation on the basis of 
race also raises avenues of inquiry that were shut out by thinking of 
segregation solely in racial terms. For example, under segregation, were 
the two types of interracial relationships treated and vie\ved in similar 
ways? Historical analysis suggests that Jim Crow segregation actually 
was a system primarily focused on preventing the development of 
intimate sexual relations between white women and black men, while 
covertly tolerating sexual relationships between white men and black 
women. 
16
·' With regards to white women, racial segregation operated as 
a paternalistic restriction on their liberties. It sought to "protect" white 
~vomen from "succumbing" to their sexual desires for black men.!&, With 
regard to black women, racial segregation was oppressive to the extent 
that it did not keep white men from having sexually exploitative and 
coercive relations with black women. 167 As Jlrofessor Ross asserts: 
"Southern laws were aimed at preventing black men from having sex 
with white women, but it was a one way ban that gave relatively free 
access to Southern white men to have sexual relations with black 
"160 
WOffit'TI, 
Jim Crow society's greater condemnation of white female-black male 
relations raises further questions regarding how racial segregation in 
public schools operated to reinforce gender-racial norms. Hov.' did all­
white schools impart beliefs to their students about the harms and evils 
of interracial relationships, particularly white female-black male 
relationships? How did all-black schools impart to their students the 
taboos about interracial relationships? Thus, renaming racial segregation 
as gender segregation on the basis of race raises questions beyond those 
concerning the educational opportunities of black schoolchildren. It 
opens inquiries into how school segregation instilled racist norms about 
'
65 Sfe Ross, <;upra nD!e 79, at 260. 
_,,. Ste id al 268-69. 
See id. at 260. 
-"' Id. 
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race, gender, and interracial relations in white and black schoolchildren. 
Furthermore, if we continue to analyze segregation as a regulation of 
gender and race relations, we see that it also controlled how persons of 
the same sex interacted with each other on the basis of race. Thus, not 
only did racial segregation separate (1) white women from black men 
and (2) white men from black women, but it also separated (3) white 
men from black men and (4) white women from black women. 
Although it is not likely that Jim Crow laws were specifically aimed at 
regulating sexual relations between members of the same gender, one 
could argue that impeding same sex social relations across racial Jines 
also reinforced white supremacy. 
With regard to separating white and black men, perhaps the main 
purpose or effect of segregation was to prevent the formation of class 
consciousness between white and black men in similar economic 
situations. In analyzing the history of the South, commentators question 
'vhy poor black and \Vhite men who shared similar economic interests 
did not join to form political coalitions. The answer given is that white 
racial consciousness trumped white class consciousness. Thus, poor 
\Vhite men disregarded their economic interests to keep political 
alliances with wealthy white men. Segregation may have reinforced 
white racial consciousness, socializing white men through segregated 
social practices to view black men as inferior, thereby decreasing the 
chances of these men building viable coalitions across racial lines. 
With regard to the segregation of white from black women, the 
separation perhaps prevented the formation of a shared feminist 
consciousness. l"he social segregation of women also inculcated white 
vvomen with notions of the inferiority of black women, making it harder 
for white women to see black women as having similar, gender-based 
interests. Thus, segregation under Jim Crow may have helped reinforce 
tvhite patriarchal norms and prevented black and white women from 
understanding that they had shared interests in issues of woman's 
equality. 
As long as segregation prevented the formation of equal social 
relations between whites and blacks along gender lines, it prevented the 
formation of new political consciousness and movements that could 
have challenged the hegemony of white supremacist and patriarchal 
social structures. However, it is difficult to raise questions about the 
multidimensional nature of segregation if segregation is understood 
solely in racial terms. Applying an anti-essentialist analysis to the 
language of racial discourse helps to show why we have failed to sec that 
segregation regulates gender relations as part of regulating race 
1350 University ofCalifornia, Davis [Vol. 39,1321 
relations, We fail to recognize the gender implications of segregation 
because \Ve use the term "race" to discuss Jim Crow apartheid and 
segregation. Using the tenn "race" focuses our attention solely on race 
relations issues, while diverting our attention from issues involving 
gender relations on the basis of race. The essentialism underlying our 
language structure tends to limit our perception of a phenomenon like 
racial segregation. We accept the single term "race" as describing the 
essence of that phenomenon. Once we label the separation of black and 
white schoolchildren into different school facilities as "racial 
segregation," we think of that process as being entirely about race, and 
therefore not about anything else. 
CONCLUSION 
Because we think of Brown as a case about racial segregation in public 
schools, our attention is directed to issues dealing with the regulation of 
race vvithin the context of education. The categories of race and 
education, therefore, have made it difficult to see Brou1n as anything but 
a case about race and education. How does viewing racial segregation as 
gender segregation on the basis of race change our legal analysis of 
Brown? I low does it affect issues of race, gender, and equal protection 
law in general? Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. The purpose of this Essay has been to start a dialogue on Brown 
as a case about race and gender and on the role of language in shaping 
our understanding of subordination. It has shown how an anti­
essentialist linguistic analysis of legal discourse can help to reveal the 
fuller, more complex, and interconnected nature of systems of 
subordination. It has then begun to use then use this more complex 
understanding to rethink our legal doctrine on subordination. 
Thus, this Essay calls on Critical Race Feminist scholars to think 
creatively about alternative language to describe systems of 
subordination - to help us to remain conscious of the interconnected 
and complex nature of subordination. Instead of talking about racial 
subordination or gender subordination, we can talk about racial-gender 
subordination. Instead of talking about racial segregation, we can talk 
about gender segregation on the basis of race or racial-gender 
segregation. We can then explore the implications of analyzing the issue 
using this new terminology. 109 
"' Of course, from an anti-essentialist standpoint, we can also rename "racial-gender 
segregation" and call it "racial-gender-class segregation," or "gender segregation on the 
basis of race and class." The point is, none of those names are the true or "essential" name 
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Although the analysis in this Essay is mostly of a historical nature, it is 
still relevant to W1derstanding racial-gender subordination today. 
Structures of racial-~ender segregation continue to exist in today's post­
civil rights society. 11 An examination of how racial-gender segregation 
continues to subordinate men and women on the basis of race is also 
beyond the scope of this Essay. But that topic needs serious critical 
examination in the future. 
for such a system of subordination. Rather, anti-essentialist analysis encourag<0s scholars to 
comt> up with as many different alt.,mativP names a~ possible in order lo derive more new 
insights into how subordination fW1clions. All names can operate simultaneously, and we 
may strategically use alternative language for specific purposes. 
'"' See generally DOUGLAS MASSEY & NAJ\'CY DENTON, A'>iERICA:\f APARTHEID: 
RESIDFNTlAI SEc;REC;AT!Ol'> AND THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (1993) (arguing that racial 
segregation, particularly rn black ghetto form, is key structural factor responsible for the 
perpetuation of black poverty in America}. 
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